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INTRODUCTION
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE implications of general equilibrium is by now abundantly clear to researchers ana-
lyzing public fi nance issues. What is perhaps less 
apparent is that this was not always so. The study of 
public fi nance was radically transformed during the 
15 years between 1959 and 1974 by the pioneering 
efforts of a small number of leading scholars, nota-
bly including Peter Mieszkowski. Thanks to their 
efforts, the analysis of applied problems in public 
fi nance moved from partial equilibrium to general 
equilibrium, providing the methods and insights 
that characterize modern public economics.
The transformation began with the publication 
of Richard Musgrave’s The Theory of Public 
Finance (1959), a book that isolated and analyzed 
the allocation, distribution, and stabilization func-
tions of government in general equilibrium settings. 
The subsequent analysis of deadweight loss, tax 
incidence, optimal taxation, effi cient provision of 
public goods, fi scal federalism, tax competition, 
behavioral responses to taxation, and a host of 
other public fi nance issues grew from the general 
equilibrium framework that Musgrave pioneered 
and that were applied and developed by those 
working on these issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM REASONING IN PUBLIC 
FINANCE
As was evident from this and other research, 
general equilibrium reasoning completely changes 
thinking about tax incidence, the effects of taxation 
on taxpayer behavior, the effi ciency consequences 
of taxation, optimal tax design, and the constraints 
that governments face in setting tax policies. The 
general equilibrium framework is so compelling 
that it makes you wonder why researchers ever use 
partial equilibrium tax analysis, though the answer 
is simple: general equilibrium tax analysis is very 
challenging. The lesson of general equilibrium is 
not only that everything affects everything else – 
but that everything affects everything else in two 
ways: through supply and through demand. So 
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thinking one’s way through this thicket is unlikely 
to be easy, particularly since human brains are 
wired for partial equilibrium.
Simple tax analysis is not necessarily bad, but 
partial equilibrium frameworks are capable of 
offering answers that are, well, wrong. That is why 
it is critically important to have tax analysis that 
sensibly works through what general equilibrium 
has to say, and that maps general equilibrium 
insights into practical implications in a way that 
normal human beings can understand. This begs 
the question of whether normal human beings can 
do general equilibrium tax analysis; the answer is 
that we can now, but only because some abnormally 
intelligent and sophisticated predecessors, notably 
including Peter Mieszkowski, showed us how.
It is instructive to consider the implications 
of general equilibrium for simple tax incidence 
problems. In partial equilibrium, the incidence of 
a tax is determined by supply and demand in the 
market for the taxed activity. If supply is inelastic 
or demand perfectly elastic, then the burden of a 
tax is borne by suppliers; conversely, if demand is 
inelastic or supply perfectly elastic, then the burden 
of a tax is borne by buyers. In general equilibrium, 
the partial equilibrium insights are still present, 
but one also traces the impact of a tax through all 
of the other markets that it may affect, which can 
entirely change the answer. For example, in the case 
of the Edgeworth/Hotelling taxation paradox, the 
imposition of an excise tax can reduce the after-tax 
price of a commodity through its effects on other 
markets, even though all markets are perfectly 
competitive (Edgeworth, 1897a, 1897b, 1897c; 
Hotelling, 1932; Vickrey, 1960). 
In the Harberger (1962) corporate income tax 
model, a higher corporate income tax can increase 
the returns to owners of corporations by depress-
ing the demand for labor, if the corporate sector is 
labor-intensive. The corporate income tax has two, 
potentially offsetting, effects on capital demand, 
one a partial equilibrium effect, the other a general 
equilibrium effect. The partial equilibrium effect 
is to encourage corporations to substitute labor for 
capital inputs, thereby reducing capital demand; this 
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was commonly understood to be the entirety of the 
effect of corporate taxes prior to the appearance of 
Harberger’s article. The general equilibrium effect 
stems from the induced reallocation of production 
in the economy. If the noncorporate sector of the 
economy uses capital more intensively than does 
the corporate sector (which is quite possible, since 
the noncorporate sector includes capital-intensive 
industries such as agriculture and real estate), then 
the reallocation of production increases the demand 
for capital. The net effect of the corporate tax on 
capital demand, and therefore on returns to owners 
of capital, thus depends on the combined effect of 
substitution and reallocation, which is an empirical 
question, and the subject of Krzyzaniak and Mus-
grave (1963), Cragg, Harberger, and Mieszkowski 
(1967), and a host of subsequent studies. While 
empirical studies have yet to reach a consensus on 
the incidence of the corporate income tax, there 
does appear to be a consensus that the tax must 
be analyzed in the general equilibrium landscape 
pioneered by Musgrave, Harberger, Mieszkowski, 
and their colleagues. Indeed, since then public 
fi nance economists have never been quite satisfi ed 
with analyzing the incidence of any tax in partial 
equilibrium, unless such analysis is supplemented 
by general equilibrium considerations.
PETER MIESZKOWSKI ON GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
TAX INCIDENCE
Peter Mieszkowski published masterful papers in 
the Journal of Political Economy in 1967 and the 
Journal of Economic Literature in 1969 in which 
he clearly elucidated and extended the general 
equilibrium theory of tax incidence. As Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980, p. 173) note, it was Mieszkowski 
who in this 1967 Journal of Political Economy 
paper identifi ed what are now understood to be the 
two main effects of corporate taxation in the Har-
berger model: the factor substitution effect and the 
output effect. In a very forward-looking summary, 
Mieszkowski (1967, p. 260) writes:
More generally, controversies, such as whether 
taxes are shifted forward onto the consumer or 
shifted back onto factor earnings, are seen to be 
sterile when viewed in general equilibrium terms. 
For example, a commodity tax on a particular com-
modity is shifted forward only in the sense that the 
price of this commodity will rise relative to other 
commodities, and this factor is of no interest if all 
groups spend the same proportions of their incomes 
on the same commodities. Furthermore, it is only 
meaningful to talk of a partial factor tax’s being 
shifted to consumers to the extent that relative com-
modity prices change and under the condition that 
it is possible to ignore the factor-substitution effect 
and the factor-intensity effects of this tax. The point 
is, of course, that there are two sides to incidence, 
the use of income and the source of income, and 
there is no a priori reason why one side should be 
given preference over the other.
Getting the theory right was just one piece of 
what Peter Mieszkowski was up to, particularly 
since confl icting forces made ultimate incidence 
an empirical question. A separate paper of his 
with John Cragg and Arnold Harberger (1967) 
in the Journal of Political Economy carefully 
reexamined the empirical analysis of the corporate 
income tax by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), 
offering fresh insights and raising doubts about 
the type of time series empirical analysis that was 
then very common.
THE “NEW VIEW” OF THE PROPERTY TAX
There was a great deal of confusion over com-
peting views of the impact of the property tax prior 
to the publication of Peter Mieszkowski’s seminal 
paper presenting the “new view” of the property tax 
in the Journal of Public Economics in 1972. The 
Mieszkowski paper shows how to reconcile these 
views, and offers the nicely derived interpretation 
that under certain conditions the burden of even 
a local property tax falls ultimately on national 
capital (as well as having some local effects).
In the Mieszkowski framework, a local property 
tax discourages local property investment, thereby 
indirectly increasing capital investment elsewhere. 
This depresses the pretax return to capital else-
where, ultimately burdening all capital owners. 
There nevertheless remain important local effects, 
and local incidence, of the property tax, but you 
miss something terribly important by ignoring 
the effect of the tax on capital everywhere. This 
interpretation was subsequently christened by 
others as the “new view” of the property tax; it is 
very important, and it still feels new.
The Mieszkowski paper on the “new view” 
appeared in the inaugural issue of the Journal 
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of Public Economics (April 1972). That issue 
featured a superstar lineup of contributors: Leif 
Johanson; James Buchanan and Charles Goetz; 
Martin Feldstein; Peter Mieszkowski; Anthony 
Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz; Mervyn King; and 
Agnar Sandmo. One indication of the importance 
of the Mieszkowski paper on the “new view” is 
that, on the front cover of the paper copy of this 
issue of the Journal of Public Economics from 
the UC-Berkeley economics department library, 
someone circled the title of the Mieszkowski paper 
and wrote in the margin, “this is the good one.”
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
Peter Mieszkowski has done extremely infl u-
ential work on interjurisdictional competition in a 
variety of contexts, including his 1986 Journal of 
Urban Economics paper with George Zodrow that 
analyzes a setting in which jurisdictions compete to 
attract mobile capital. In this model, tax competition 
leads to low tax rates, thereby producing ineffi -
ciently small public sectors – ineffi cient in the sense 
that coordinated policies among jurisdictions would 
produce a Pareto improvement. How much of this 
actually happens in our world? I’m not sure, and 
no one else is either – but what I do know for sure 
is that the standard framework for analyzing these 
questions dates to the publication of this article.
Populations are also mobile, and Peter Miesz-
kowski’s extremely important 1974 Journal of 
Public Economics paper with Frank Flatters and 
Vernon Henderson considered a setting in which 
individuals are mobile and there are imperfectly 
corrected congestion externalities, fi nding that the 
migration process signifi cantly affects the effi ciency 
of local public good provision. Intergovernmental 
grants have the potential to affect these outcomes, 
and this article and follow-up work by Peter Miesz-
kowski and George Zodrow (in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, 1989) and Peter Mieszkowski 
and Richard Musgrave (in the National Tax Journal, 
1999) evaluated these and other issues.
A “NEW VIEW” OF PETER MIESZKOWSKI
The decades of the 1960s and 1970s are 
remembered for many things; one of the things 
for which they surely should be remembered is 
the transformation that took place in the way that 
public economics was understood and practiced. 
The essence of Peter Mieszkowski’s “new view” 
of the property tax is that the tax policies of one 
jurisdiction, however small, can have signifi cant 
price effects elsewhere.
Can the same be true of individuals? Can it be 
that the activities of a lone scholar, thinking deeply 
and publishing his insights, can affect the world 
of scholars in such a signifi cant way? Of course it 
can.
We have Peter Mieszkowski and a very small 
number of others to thank for utterly transforming 
the way that the rest of us think about taxation – 
and not in some arid, abstract manner, but in a 
very real and practical way, connected to theory, 
connected to data, and connected to the tax policies 
that concern the world every day.
Cast in “new view” terms, Peter Mieszkowski’s 
work lowered the cost of insight for the rest of us.
References
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Lectures on 
Public Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
Cragg, John G., Arnold C. Harberger, and Peter Miesz-
kowski. Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of 
the Corporation Income Tax. Journal of Political 
Economy 75 (December 1967): 811-821.
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 
  The Pure Theory of Taxation, Part I. Economic Jour-
 nal 7 (March 1897a): 46-70. 
  The Pure Theory of Taxation, Part II. Economic 
 Journal 7 (June 1897b): 226-238. 
  The Pure Theory of Taxation, Part III. Economic 
 Journal 7 (December 1897c): 550-571.
Flatters, Frank, Vernon Henderson, and Peter Miesz-
kowski. Public Goods, Efficiency, and Regional 
Fiscal Equalization. Journal of Public Economics 3 
(May 1974): 99-112.
Harberger, Arnold C. The Incidence of the Corporation 
Income Tax. Journal of Political Economy 70 (June 
1962): 215-240.
Hotelling, Harold. Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox and 
the Nature of Demand and Supply Functions. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 40 (October 1932): 577-
616.
Krzyzaniak, Marian and Richard A. Musgrave. The Shift-
ing of the Corporation Income Tax. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
Mieszkowski, Peter. 
  On the Theory of Tax Incidence. Journal of Political 
 Economy 75 (June 1967): 250-262.
  Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the 
 Distribution of Income. Journal of Economic 
 Literature 7 (December 1969): 1103-1124.
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS
216
  The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profi ts Tax? 
 Journal of Public Economics 1 (April 1972): 73-
 96.
Mieszkowski, Peter and Richard A. Musgrave. Federal-
ism, Grants, and Fiscal Equalization. National Tax 
Journal 52 (June 1999): 239-260.
Mieszkowski, Peter and George R. Zodrow. Taxation 
and the Tiebout model: The Differential Effects of 
Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property 
Taxes. Journal of Economic Literature 27 (September 
1989): 1098-1146.
Musgrave, Richard A. The Theory of Public Finance. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
Vickrey, William. Can Excises Lower Prices? In Ralph 
Pfouts, ed. Essays in Economics and Econometrics: 
A Volume in Honor of Harold Hotelling. Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1960, 
pp. 165-177.
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski. Pigou, 
Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision 
of Local Public Goods. Journal of Urban Economics 
19 (May 1986): 356-370.
